题目：Salary History Bans and Corporate Innovation

时间：2023.2.23（周四） 14:30

地点：院系楼401会议室

报告人：邓 林 博士（澳门城市大学）

主持人：刘 浩 博士

报告摘要

This paper finds that firms experience a decline in innovation performance following the adoption of salary history bans (SHBs) which prohibit employers from asking job candidates’ salary history in the hiring process. We hypothesize that SHBs provide job

seekers with stronger bargaining power, thus imposing higher difficulties for employers to hire efficient inventors. Consistent with this hypothesis, first, we find that employee wages increase after SHBs. Second, we document that firms hire fewer and less efficient inventors. Third, we show that restrictions on unions’ strength neutralize the adverse effect of SHBs on innovation.

报告人简介

邓林 博士

邓林，澳门城市大学金融学助理教授，博士毕业于内布拉斯加大学林肯分校。研究领域为实证公司金融，包括公司创新，融资结构，融资成本等。现阶段工作论文的课题主要为研究股东权利及劳动力保护对公司运作的影响。

图文 | 湛彩华

编辑 | 顾哲喻 湛彩华

初审 | 顾哲瑜

复审 | 张 浩

终审 | 徐昶斌