题目：Trust and Contracts: Empirical Evidence
时间：9月27日 10:00-11:30
地点：院系楼401会议室
报告人：姚加权

报告摘要：Trust between parties should drive the design of contracts: if parties were uncertain about each others’  reaction to unplanned events, they might agree to pay higher costs of negotiation ex ante to complete contracts. Using a unique sample of U.S. consulting contracts and a negative shock to trust between shareholders/managers (principals) and consultants (agents) staggered across space and over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Not only contract complexity but also the verifiable states of the world covered by contracts increase after a negative shock to trust. The results hold for several novel text-analysis-based measures of contract completeness and do not arise when agents are also principals or in other falsification tests. Non-compete agreements, confidentiality and indemnification clauses, and restrictions to agents’ actions are more likely to be added to contracts signed in the same locations, same industries, and same years after a negative shock to trust.

报告人简介：姚加权，暨南大学金融学教授，博导。博士毕业于新加坡南洋理工大学，研究方向包括公司金融、金融科技、实证资产定价、文本分析和机器学习，论文发表于Review of Financial Studies，Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis，Journal of Banking and Finance，Journal of Business, Finance & Accounting，Journal of International Money and Finance和《管理科学学报》等国内外权威期刊，以及计算机顶会WWW2018和KDD2020。担任Review of Finance, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control，Journal of Business, Finance & Accounting，《管理世界》，《管理科学学报》等国内外权威期刊审稿人。